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Abstract
In a discrete choice model of product di¤erentiation, the symmetric duopoly price
may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single-product monopoly price. While
themarket share e¤ect of competition encourages a rm to charge less than the monopoly
price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity e¤ect of compe-
tition motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the rms demand
curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products
determines the relative strength of these e¤ects, and whether presence of a symmet-
ric competitor results in a higher or lower price compared to single-product monopoly.
The analysis reveals that price-increasing competition is unexceptional from a theoret-
ical perspective.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental insight of economics is that competition usually lowers prices. The
strength of this conclusion, however, is called into question by scattered evidence from
assorted industries. For example, Pauly and Sattherthwaite (1981) argue that physician
services are priced higher in urban areas with more physicians per capita; Bresnaham and
Reiss (1991) present survey evidence showing that automobile tire prices are somewhat
higher in local markets with two dealers rather than one, although the di¤erence is not
statistically signicant; Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) infer from the structure of local auto
retail markets that prot margins might be higher under duopoly than monopoly; Perlo¤,
Suslow, and Seguin (2005) conclude that new entry raises prices in the anti-ulcer drug mar-
ket; Ward et al. (2002) provide evidence that new entry of private labels raises prices of
name-brand goods in the food industry;1 Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) show that airlines
raise route prices when Southwest opens new routes to the same destination from a nearby
airport; and Thomadsen (2005) simulates with estimated parameters from the fast food in-
dustry how prices may rise with closer geographic positioning of competitors. A theoretical
re-consideration of how competition a¤ects prices thus seems appropriate.
In this paper, we study a discrete choice model of product di¤erentiation in which con-
sumersvalues for two substitute products have an arbitrary symmetric joint distribution.
Each rm produces a single product, and the market structure is either monopoly or
duopoly. We characterize under weak assumptions a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for the symmetic duopoly price to be higher than, equal to, or lower than monopoly price.
This condition balances two economic e¤ects. At the monopoly price, a duopoly rm sells to
fewer consumers than the monopolist. The larger is this di¤erence, the greater is the incen-
tive of a duopolist to reduce price below the monopoly level. We call this the market share
e¤ect. On the other hand, under product di¤erentiation a duopoly rms demand curve
1More precisely, the entry of private labels raises the price of the national brands, with a possible in-
crease of average market price. See also Caves, Whinston, and Hurwicz (1991) and Grabowski and Vernon
(1992) for evidence that generic entry triggers higher prices for corresponding brand-name drugs in the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry.
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may be steeper than the monopolists, because consumers have a choice of products in the
duopoly case, and, therefore, are less keen to purchase the duopolists product in response
to a price cut. The steeper is the duopolists demand curve, relative to the monopolists, the
greater is the incentive of the duopolist to raise price above the monopoly level. We call this
the price sensitivity e¤ect. When the second e¤ect dominates, as, for example, if consumer
values for the two products are drawn from a (Gumbel) bivariate exponential distribution,
duopoly competition increases price compared to monopoly. We derive from the general
necessary and su¢ cient condition various particular conditions under which price is higher
under symmetric single-product duopoly than under single-product monopoly. For exam-
ple, if consumer values for the two products are independent, the duopoly price is higher if
the hazard rate of the marginal distribution function is decreasing.
We further analyze a class of special cases in which the calculation of monopoly and
duopoly prices is straightforward. In these special cases, consumer preferences for two
products have a joint uniform distribution on a varying support allowing di¤erent degrees
of negative or positive correlation. This analysis includes a new and unied treatment
of two familiar models in oligopoly analysis. The Hotelling duopoly model (Hotelling,
1929) is a limiting case in which the preferences are perfectly negatively correlated, and
the Bertrand duopoly model is a limiting case when the preferences are perfectly positively
correlated. Duopoly competition raises price if consumerspreferences for the two products
are su¢ ciently diverse and negatively correlated, as for instance in the Hotelling model when
the market is fully served under duopoly but not under monopoly.
The standard view of relationship between market structure and price has been challenged
also by several other theoretical studies. For instance, when consumers must search to nd
rmsprices, the presence of more rms makes it more di¢ cult to nd the lowest price
in the market, reducing consumers incentives to search. This can cause the equilibrium
market price to increase with the number of competitors (Stiglitz, 1987).2 An alternative
2Also, Satterthwaite (1979) considers a model where rms produce reputation goods and an increase
in the number of rms can reduce the e¢ cieny of search by consumers. On the other hand, Schulz and
Stahl (1996) considers a model where consumers have uncertain product valuations that must be discovered
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approach assumes that each seller faces two groups of consumers, a captured loyal group
and a switching group. With more sellers, each sellers share of the switching group is
reduced, increasing its incentive to exploit the captured consumers through a higher price;
but equilibrium prices under competition are in mixed strategies (Rosenthal, 1980).3 In
contrast, in our analysis here, consumers have perfect information, and rmsprices are in
pure strategies. While Chen and Riordan (2005) and Perlo¤, Suslow, and Seguin (2005)
have also shown that competition can increase price under perfect information and pure
strategies, these papers rely on specic spatial models where consumer valuations for two
products are perfectly negatively correlated.4 Our present paper goes further by develop-
ing a necessary and su¢ cient condition for price-increasing competition in a more general
symmetric model of product di¤erentiation, and clarifying the economic e¤ects associated
with this condition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates and analyzes the general
model. Section 3 analyzes the special cases of a uniform distribution of preferences on a
varying support, thus generalling limiting cases of Hotelling duopoly and Bertrand duopoly.
Section 4 compares duopoly competition with a multiproduct monopoly producing both
products, demonstrating the expected result that the symmetric multiproduct monopoly
price exceeds the duopoly price. Section 5 draws conclusions. Detailed calculations for
Section 3 are in the Appendix.
through search. An increase in the number of rms in their model can increase the returns from search and
market demand, resulting in higher prices.
3 In a similar setting with high- and low-valuation types of consumers, entry and endogenous product
selection can result in market segmentation with the incumbent raising its price to sell only to high-valuation
customers, if the game is solved with a solution concept that is not Nash equilibrium. See Davis, Murphy,
and Topel (2004).
4Perlo¤, Suslow, and Seguin (2005) study a variant of the Hotelling duopoly model, while Chen and
Riordan (2005) generalize the Hotelling model to an arbitrary number of single-product rms.
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2. DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
Preferences
Each consumer desires to purchase at most one of two goods. The preferences of a con-
sumer are described by reservation values for the two goods, (v1; v2) ; where vi 2 [v; v]; and
0  v < v  1: The distribution of preferences over the population of consumers is assumed
to be nondegenerate and symmetric. Thus, the population of consumers, the size of which is
normalized to one, is described by a marginal distribution function F (v1) and a conditional
distribution function G (v2 j v1) : These distribution functions are assumed to be di¤eren-
tiable on [v; v], with associated density functions f (v1) and g (v2 j v1) : The joint density
function, therefore, is h (v1; v2)  f (v1) g (v2 j v1). The support of the corresponding joint
distribution function, 
  [v; v]2, is symmetric about the 45oline.
Monopoly
First, consider a single rm producing one of the two goods with a constant unit cost
c 2 [v; v): The rm sets a price to solve the "monopoly problem":
max
pc
(p  c) [1  F (p)] : (1)
Assumption 1. There exists a unique interior solution to the monopoly problem, pm 2
(c; v):
The necessary rst-order condition for the solution to the monopoly problem is
[1  F (pm)]  (pm   c) f (pm) = 0: (2)
The rst-order condition can also be written as
(pm   c)(pm) = 1, (3)
where
(v)  f(v)
1  F (v) (4)
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denotes the hazard rate.
Su¢ cient primitive conditions for Assumption 1 are: (v   c)(v) > 1;5 and (v) contin-
uously increasing on [c; v]. The familiar monotone hazard rate condition, however, is not
necessary. For example, Assumption 1 holds if F (v) is a standard exponential distribution
and (v) = 1, and, therefore, by continuity, also holds for su¢ ciently small departures from
the exponential case. More generally, if (v) is di¤erentiable, then su¢ cient conditions for
Assumption 1 are: (i) (v   c)(v) > 1; and (ii) d ln(p)dp >   1p c for p 2 [c; v] : Thus a de-
creasing or non-monotonic hazard rate is consistent with our analysis, although a uniformly
decreasing hazard rate requires v =1.
Duopoly
Second, consider two rms, each producing one of the two products with constant unit
cost c: The two rms play a duopoly game, setting prices simultaneously and independently
and each maximizing its own prot given equilibrium beliefs about the rivals action.
Assuming its rival sets p; each rm sets a price to solve the duopoly problem:
max
p





[1 G (p j v)] f (v) dv +
Z v+minf0;p pg
p
[1 G (v   p+ p j v)] f (v) dv: (6)
Assumption 2. There exists a unique interior symmetric equilibrium of the duopoly game,
pd 2 (c; v):
A best response function, p = R (p) ; describes a solution to the duopoly problem for each
p: The symmetric equilibrium of the duopoly game is a unique interior xed point of a best




, on the domain [c; v]. Su¢ cient conditions for Assumption 2
are: (iii) R (p) is unique for all p 2 [c; v]; (iv) R (c) > c; (v) R (v) < v; (vi) R (p) continuous;
5We adopt the notational convention (v   c)(v) = lim
v!1
(v   c)(v) if v =1:
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and (vii) R (p) crosses the 45o degree line but once (from above). Note that R (v) = pm
means that condition (v) follows from Assumption 1.








The rst order condition for a solution to the duopoly problem is
(p  c)(p; p) = 1: (8)
Therefore, p = R (p) is the unique solution to this equation if, for all c   p  v : (i)







for p 2 [c; v]. These primitive conditions are analagous to those that support Assumption
1 and are su¢ cient for Assumption 2. In fact, the conditions are the same when
 
p = v.
Alternatively, Assumption 2 is satised if pd uniquely solves
(p  c)(p; p) = 1
and (p  c)(p; pd) is strictly increasing in p.
An important special case is the independent exponential case with
 
v =1 and
G(v1jv2) = F (v1)  1  e v1






















Therefore, conditions (i)-(ii) hold strictly, and pd = pm = c+ 1 . Because conditions (i)-
(ii) hold strictly for the case of a constant hazard rate, it is possible to perturb h (v1; v2)
around the independent exponential case and still satisfy the assumptions. Thus, our
analysis below applies to cases of increasing, decreasing, and non-monotonic hazard rates.
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Comparison
Third, compare the duopoly price and the monopoly price. A useful restatement of the
rst-order condition of the monopoly problem isZ v
v
[1 G (pmjv)] f (v) dv   (pm   c)
Z v
v
g (pmjv) f (v) dv = 0: (9)
For the purpose of comparing monopoly and duopoly, it is useful to dene the function
	(p) 
nR p
v [1 G (pjv)] f (v) dv +
R v




v g (pjv) f (v) dv +
R v












= 0, which at equilibrium is the
necessary rst-order condition for the duopoly problem. The comparison of monopoly and
duopoly relies on the following additional assumption.
Assumption 3. 	(p)  0 if and only if c  p  pd, and 	(p)  0 if and only if pd  p  v.
Assumption 3 holds for the same su¢ cient conditions stated above for Assumption 2. In
particular, the assumption holds if R (p) crosses the 45o degree line once from above.




= 0 and Assumption 3 that pd  pm if 	(pm)  0; and, conversely,
















Therefore, we have the following comparison.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1-3, pd  pm if and only ifZ v
pm
[G (vjv) G (pmjv)] f (v) dv

 (pm   c)
Z v
pm












Fig. 1. Comparing single-product monopoly and symmetric duopoly
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The set of possible preferences, 
; is represented by the shaded circle. The line dividing
the circle, labelled pm; represents the monopoly price. The area of the circle above this line
(region A + region B) represents the market share6 of monopolist selling good 1. Region
A alone represents the market share of a duopolist selling product 1 when both duopolists
charge pm. Thus, the wedge-shaped region B is equal to di¤erence in market share for
a monopolist charging pm and for a duopolist when both rms charge pm. The larger is
this di¤erence, the greater is the incentive of a duopolist to reduce price. Call this the
"market share e¤ect" of competition. The probability that preferences lie within region
B is
R v
pm [G (v j v) G (pm j v)] f (v) dv, which is the left-hand side of the expression in
Theorem 1. Next consider the two straight edges of the wedge. Di¤erence in the density
of preferences along these edges is
R v
pm [g (v j v)  g (pm j v)] f (v) dv, which is part of the
right-hand side of the expression in Theorem 1. This amount is di¤erence in the slope of
the duopolists (residual) demand curve and the monopolists demand curve at price pm.
The steeper is the duopolists demand curve, relative to the monopolists, the greater is the
incentive of the duopolist to raise price above pm. Call this the "price sensitivity e¤ect"
of competition. In order for pd > pm; it is thus necessary, but not su¢ cient, that the
duopolists demand curve is steeper than the monopolists. This necessary condition can
often hold under product di¤erentiation, because consumers have a choice of products in the
duopoly case, and, therefore, are less keen to purchase the duopolists product in response
to a price cut.7 To sum up, Theorem 1 states that the duopolist will have incentive to
raise price above the monopoly level if the price sensitivity e¤ect is su¢ ciently important
compared to the market share e¤ect.
A provocative application of the theorem is the case of a (Gumbel) bivariate exponential
distribution:
h(v1; v2) = [(1 + v1) (1 + v2)  ] exp f v1   v2   v1v2g
6Here market share" means the portion of the consumer population who are purchasing the product, or
market coverage.
7This condition is more likely to hold when consumerspreferences for the two prodcuts are negatively
correlated; but negative correlation is not required.
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Fig. 2. Bivariate exponential case
with 0    1. The vi are independent for  = 0, and negatively correlated for 0 <   1.
The marginal distributions of v1 and v2 are standard exponential distributions. Therefore,
pm = 1 if c = 0. In this case, a straightforward numerical analysis establishes that pd = 1
if  = 0, and pd > 1 if  > 0. Fig. 2 graphs the function 	(p) for  = 0 (solid line), and
 = 1 (dashed line). The curve is downward sloping as required by Assumption 3,8 and the
duopoly solution occurs where 	(p) = 0. The diagram shows that 	(1) = 0 for  = 0 and
	(1) > 0 for  = 1. The graph of 	(p) for intermediate cases 0 <  < 1 is between these
two extremes. Therefore, competition increases price in the bivariate exponential case.
8 It is straightforward to verify numerically that the prot function of duopolist is quasi-concave when
the rival charges pd satisfying 	(pd) = 1, implying Assumption 2.
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Proceeding more generally, let
(pjv) = g(pjv)
1 G(pjv) (13)
denote the conditional hazard rate. Then the condition of Theorem 1 can be written asZ v
pm












which leads to the following conclusion.9
Corollary 1 Assume v =1. Then pd > pm if (vjv) < (pmjv) for v > pm.
The bivariate exponential distribution has these properties for  > 0, and, therefore,
provides a special case of the corollary.
Next, consider the independence case from a more general perspective. If v1 and v2
























Therefore, we have the following comparison.










f(v)2dv  0; (15)
and the converse.
Therefore, if v1 and v2 are independently and identically distributed and Assumption 1-3
hold, then pd < pm if (v) is increasing, and, conversely pd > pm if (v) is decreasing. We
next provide an example where pd > pm for independent valuations.
9Note that (vjv) < (pmjv) implies g(vjv) < g(pmjv) for v > pm.
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Example 1 Consider the following case for v = 1 and  > 0: c > 0; (v) = v , F (v) =







=  1p >   1p c . To be concrete, assume that  = 3 and  = c = 2. It follows






e 2[ln v ln]dv + p e











It can be checked numerically that (p   c)(p; p) is strictly increasing in p. Solving (p  
c)(p; p) = 1 yields pd = 3:037. Furthermore, it can be checked numerically that (p  
c)(p; pd), evaluated at  = 3, c = 2 and pd = 3:037, is strictly increasing in p: Thus pd is
indeed the equilibrium price, and we have pd > pm in this example.
Finally, consider Theorem 1 in terms of the shape of g (v2jv1) for v1  pm and v  v2  v1.
The condition of Theorem 1 is equivalent to 	
 
pM










g (v1jv1) f (v1) dv1
 (pm   c)
Z v
pm
g (pmjv) f (v) dv

:
As a benchmark, consider the independent exponential case, in which this condition holds
with equality. Now, starting from the independent exponential case, for each v1  pm,
rotate g (v2jv1) around pm by shifting probability density from v2 > pm to v2 < pm: These
rotations do not alter f (v1), and, therefore, do not e¤ect pm or the right-hand side of the
above inequality. The rotations, however, decrease
R v1
pm g (v2jv1) dv2 and
R v1
pm g (v1jv1) dv1
for v1 > pm, thus decreasing the left-hand side of the inequality. Consequently, starting
from the independent exponential case, "negative rotations" of g (v2jv1) around pm result
in pd > pm. Conversely, "positive rotations" result in pd < pm. This demonstrates that
there are large families of cases for which the symmetric duopoly price either exceeds or
falls short of the monopoly price.
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The following result formalizes these obserations.
Corollary 3 Let f(v1) = e v1 and g(v2jv1) = (v1; v2) + f(v2) for  > 0, and
(v1; p
m) = 0
for all v1 2 [v; v].10 If, in addition,
(v1; v2) > 0 for v  v2  pm
and
(v1; v2) < 0 for pm  v2  v;
then pd > pm. Conversely, if
(v1; v2) < 0 for v  v2  pm;
and
(v1; v2) > 0 for pm  v2  v;
then pd < pm:
Note that Assumptions 1-3 necessarily hold for  > 0 su¢ ciently small, because su¢ cient
conditions for these assumptions hold strictly when  = 0. Furthermore, the result allows
for either negative or positive correlation of v1 and v2.
3. UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF PREFERENCES
We next consider an analytically more tractable model of preferences, where (v1; v2) are
uniformly distributed, to illustrate the comparison of prices under monopoly and duopoly.
10Obviously, Z v
v
(v1; v2)dv2 = 0;
since g(v2jv1) is a conditional density. Furthermore, the symmetry of h(v1; v2) also constrains (v1; v2).
It is, however, possible to construct (v1; v2) that satisfy these conditions, as well as the following rotation
conditions.
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This model allows each consumers valuations for the two products to have various forms
of negative or positive correlations, with the familiar Hotelling and Bertrand models as
limiting cases.
Suppose the support for (v1; v2) ; 
; is a rectangular area on the v1-v2 space that is formed
by segments of four lines with the following inequalities:
2 (1 + a)  v1 + v2  2;
b  v1   v2   b;
(16)
where a 2 (0;1) and b 2 (0; 1]:11 Suppose that (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on 
: Then
 (v1; v2) =
1
2ab
; (v1; v2) 2 
: (17)
When b ! 0; 
 converges to an upward sloping line; in the limit, v1 and v2 have perfect
positive correlation and the model becomes the standard model of Bertrand competition
with a downward sloping demand curve. On the other hand, when a ! 0; 
 converges to
a downward sloping line; in the limit v1 and v2 have perfect negative correlation and the
model becomes one of Hotelling competition with the unit transportation cost being 1, the
length of the Hotelling line being
p
2b; and consumers valuing either product variety at 2+b2
(not including the transportation cost). In fact, we may consider 
 as consisting of a dense
map of lines v1+v2 = x; x 2 [2; 2 (1 + a)]; each having length
p
2b and being parallel to line
v1 + v2 = 2: Each of these line segments corresponds to a Hotelling line with length equal
to
p
2b; unit transportation cost equal to 1, and consumer valuation equal to x+b2 : Fig. 3
illustrates 
 for representative values of a and b = 1.
We rst obtain the prices under duopoly and under monopoly. We have:
Lemma 1 With Uniform Distributions, the (symmetric) equilibrium price under duopoly
11The parameter restriction b  1 is imposed to ensure that, when a! 0; in the duopoly equilibrium all
consumers will purchase with positive surpluses: As we will see shortly, the equilibrium duopoly price will
always be pd = b: If a ! 0; v1 + v2 ! 2; and b  1 is needed so that the consumer with v1 = v2 will still











 is an oriented rectangle
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24ab  4b+ b2 + 4 if maxfb  23 ; 0g  a < 1 + b
1+a
2 if 1 + b  a
. (18)
Notice that the equilibrium duopoly price, pd = b; is simply the equilibrium price of the
Hotelling model when a ! 0 and 
 collapses to a single downward sloping line. The
Hotelling solution generalizes because 
 is essentially a collection of stacked Hotelling lines,
for each of which b is a best response to b. Calculation of the monopoly price is slightly
more complicated. Details of the calculations that establish Lemma 1 as well as Proposition
1 below are contained in an appendix.
The variance and correlation coe¢ cient of v1 and v2 are also calculated in the Appendix,
and they are






= V ar (v2) ;
 =
(a  b) (a+ b)
a2 + b2
:
Therefore, given the parameter restrictions a > 0 and 0 < b  1, the case a < b corresponds
to negative correlation, a = b to independence, and a > b to positive correlation.
The comparison of the duopoly and monopoly prices is straight forward:
pm   pd =
8>>><>>>:
a 3b+2






24ab  4b+ b2 + 4 if maxfb  23 ; 0g  a < 1 + b
1+a
2   b if 1 + b  a
: (19)
Analysis of this equation yields the following comparison:
Proposition 1 Under uniform Distributions,
pm   pd
8>>><>>>:
< 0 if 0 < a < (3b 2)(7b 2)8b and b >
2
3
= 0 if 0 < a = (3b 2)(7b 2)8b and b >
2
3
> 0 if otherwise
: (20)
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We note that when b > 23 ; b   23 < (3b 2)(7b 2)8b < b; and (3b 2)(7b 2)8b increases in b:
Thus in this model of uniform distributions, duopoly price is higher than monopoly price
if a is su¢ ciently small relative to b and b is above certain critical value, or if  is small
and V ar (vi) is high enough. This amounts to stating that competition increases price
if consumer preferences are su¢ ciently negatively correlated and diverse. The parameter
values with this feature represent a plausible but relatively small region of the preference
space considered.
Unlike under more general distributions, under uniform distributions competition in-
creases price only if preferences are negatively correlated (a < b).
4. MULTIPRODUCT MONOPOLY
As other studies in the literature concerning the e¤ects of market structure on prices, our
main interest in this paper is to compare duopoly and monopoly prices for single-product
rms. This comparion sheds light, for instance, on situations where a competitor with
a di¤erentiated product enters a market that is initially monopolized. For completeness,
we now also compare the price of a multi-product monopolist who sells both products
and a pair of duopolists. The result is the expected one: the symmetric multiproduct
monopoly price exceeds the duopoly price, conrming the intuition that a multiproduct
monopolist internalizes the externality between products that is ignored by competing rms
under independent pricing. Hence, from the perpective of the guidelines used by the U.S.
government to evaluate horizontal mergers, a signicantly higher multiproduct monopoly
price indicates that the two products are in the same antitrust market.12
A single rm producing both products solves the "multiproduct monopoly problem":
max
(p1;p2)2[c;v]2
(p1   c) q(p1; p2) + (p2   c) q(p2; p1): (21)
Assumption 4. There exists a unique interior symmteric solution to the multiproduct
monopoly problem, pmm 2 (c; v):
12U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued April
2, 1992, revised April 9, 1997, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html. .
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The rst-order condtion for a symmetric solution isZ pmm
v
[1 G (pmm j v)] f (v) dv +
Z v
pmm
[1 G (v j v)] f (v) dv
  (pmm   c)
Z pmm
v
g (pmm j v) f (v) dv +
Z v
pmm




[1 G (pmm j pmm)] f (pmm) +
Z v
pmm
g (v j v) f (v) dv

= 0:
Recalling the denition of 	() from equation (10), the rst-order condition is equivalent
to
	(pmm) + (pmm   c)

[1 G (pmm j pmm)] f (pmm) +
Z v
pmm









= 0; and by Assumption 3, 	(p) < 0 if and only if p > pd; we have
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 2-4, pmm > pd:
This result is familiar, and the intuition is well known: the price change of one product
a¤ects the prot of another product; this e¤ect is not taken into account when the duopolists
set prices independently, but the multiproduct monopolist internalizes this e¤ect when
setting prices jointly for the two products. Consequently, since the products are substitutes
here, the multiproduct monopolist charges a higher price for the two products than the
duopolists.13
Therefore, comparing prices between a multiproduct monopolist and single-product com-
petitiors is very di¤erent from comparing prices under di¤erent market structures with
13 If the two products were complements (and hence consumers might buy both products), prices would
again be lower under multiproduct monopoly than under duopoly competition, More generally, whether or
not prices are higher under the multiproduct monopoly depends on the nature of relations between products
(e.g., Chen, 2000; and Davis and Murphy, 2000).
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single-product rms. In the former, the results are based on the familiar idea of a monop-
olist internalizing the externalities between di¤erent products. In the latter, the forces at
work have not been well understood. The contribution of our analysis is to explain the
e¤ects determining how prices change from monopoly to duopoly for single-product rms,
and identify precise conditions for price-increasing competition.
5. CONCLUSION
The relationship between market structure and price is a central issue in economics.
This paper has provided a complete comparison of equilibrium prices under single-product
monopoly and symmetric duopoly in an otherwise general discrete choice model of product
di¤erentiation. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for price-increasing competition bal-
ances two e¤ects of entry by a symmetric rm into a monopoly market, the market share
e¤ect and the price sensitivity e¤ect. The market share e¤ect is that a reduced quantity
per rm under duopoly provides an incentive for the rms to cut price below the monopoly
level. The price sensitivity e¤ect is that a steeper demand curve resulting from greater
consumer choice provides an incentive to raise price. Under certain conditions the price
sensitivity e¤ect outweighs the market share e¤ect, resulting in a higher symmetric duopoly
price compared to monopoly. For example, the symmetric duopoly price is higher than the
single-product monopoly price if consumersvalues for the two products are independently
drawn from a distribution function with a descreasing hazard rate. A class of special cases
is when consumer values for two products have a joint uniform distribution on a varying
oriented rectangular support. This framework nests the familiar Hotelling and Bertrand
models. Competition increases prices in these cases if valuations are su¢ ciently diverse and
negatively correlated. More generally, however, competition can lead to higher prices even
with independent or positively correlated values. In summary, our analysis shows that the
consumer preferences leading to price-increasing competition are by no means exceptional.
The theoretical possibility of price-increasing competition potentially has important im-
plications for emprical industrial organization. For instance, it is a standard procedure
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of the new empirical industrial organization to estimate a discrete choice di¤erentiated
products demand model, and infer unobservable marginal costs from the corresponding
rst-order conditions for equilibrium pricing (Berry, 1994). If the demand model presumes
restrictions on consumer preferences that are inconsistent with price-increasing competi-
tion, then the analysis might mistakenly conclude that marginal costs are higher in duopoly
markets than monopoly markets.14
There are several promising directions for further theoretical research. Under product
di¤erentiation, higher price in the presence of an additional rm need not mean that con-
sumers are worse o¤; consumersbenet from the additional variety should be considered.
It is thus desirable to extend our analysis to understand fully how competition a¤ects con-
sumer welfare and social welfare.15 Another direction for future research is to consider the
relationship between market structure and prices with an arbitrary number of rms. Chen
and Riordan (2005) provides an analysis within a spatial setting, the spokes model. It would
be interesting to study the relationship in a more general framework of preferences.
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, there is scattered empirical evidence pointing
to the phenomenon of price-increasing competition in several industries. We hope that our
theory stimulates new empirical research on the topic.
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This appendix calculates and compares single-product monopoly and symmetric duopoly
prices for the uniform-distribution cases of Section 3.
Case 1: a < b
In this case, 
 is described by
v1 2 (2 b2 ; 1 + b2 + a); and
v2 2
8>>><>>>:
(2  v1; v1 + b) if 2 b2  v1 < 2 b2 + a
(2  v1; 2 (1 + a)  v1) if 2 b2 + a  v1 < 2+b2
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2  v1 < 2+b2 + a
v1   b < v2 < 2 (1 + a)  v1
:
First, the monopoly price, pm; satises
1  F (pm)  pmf (pm) = 0:
(1) If a < b  23 ; since for p  2 b2 + a;
1  F (p)  pf (p) = 1  (2p+ b  2)
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8ab



























(3b  2  3a) > 0;
we have pm > 2 b2 + a: For
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or pm = a+b+24 ; and indeed
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For p 2 [2+b2 ; 2+b2 + a);
1  F (p)  pf (p) = 1 







  p2 (1 + a) + b  2p
2ab
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  b  2a  2 = 0
and





  b  2a  2 = 2 (b  a+ 2) > 0:
Thus pm = a+b+24 if a < b  23 :
(2) If max {b  23 ; 0g  a < b; for p  2 b2 + a; we have





=  8bp  16p  8ab  4b+ b
2 + 12p2 + 4
8ab
;
which is decreasing in p if p > 2 b3 : Thus the solution to
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
  (6a+ 2  b)2 = 4a (3b  3a  2)  0


























(6a+ 2  b)2 = 2  b
2
+ a:
Next, consider the duopoly price.
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Suppose rst that 2 b2 + a < 1: If
2 b
2 < p
d < 2 b2 + a < 1; or a <
b
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Or pd = b: Thus pd = b if b < 2 b2 + a:
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Again pd = b:
To summarize, for a < b; we have
pd = b;
pm =









If 0 < a  b  23 ;










and if 0 = maxfb  23 ; 0g < a < b;






 4b+ b2 + 4 = 2  3b
2
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24ab  4b+ b2 + 4 = b
Thus, noticing that b  23 < (3b 2)(7b 2)8b < b for b  23  0; we have
pm   pd
8>>><>>>:
< 0 if 0 < a < (3b 2)(7b 2)8b and b >
2
3
= 0 if 0 < a = (3b 2)(7b 2)8b and b >
2
3
> 0 if either (3b 2)(7b 2)8b < a < b and b >
2
3 ; or 0 < a < b  23 .
: (A2)
In other words, pm < pd if both a is relatively small and b relatively large.
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(a  b) (a+ b)
a2 + b2
:
We have  < 0 for a < b; and !  1 if a! 0: Thus, if v1 and v2 are su¢ ciently negatively
correlated, and V ar (vi) or b is relatively large (or preference is su¢ ciently diverse), we will
have pm < pd:













































a (v1   1) if 2+b2  v1 < 2 b2 + a
(2v1 2a+b 2)(3b+2 2v1+2a)
8ab + 1  b2a if 2 b2 + a  v1 < 2+b2 + a
;







2  v1 < 2+b2




2  v1 < 2 b2 + a




2 + a  v1 < 2+b2 + a













2  v1 < 2+b2







2  v1 < 2 b2 + a







2 + a  v1 < 2+b2 + a
v1   b < v2 < 2 (1 + a)  v1
:
Under monopoly:
For b  a < 1 + b; pm < 2+b2 and solves:
1  F (p)  pf (p) = 1  (2p+ b  2)
2
8ab
  p2p+ b  2
2ab
=  8bp  16p+ 12p











24ab  4b+ b2 + 4;
and indeed 2 b3 < p
m < 2+b2 :
For a  1 + b; 2+b2  pm < 2 b2 + a; and it solves













Under duopoly, we again have pd = 1 from straightforward calculations.
In summary: if a  b; we have
pd = b
pm =
8<: 2 b3 + 16
p
24ab  4b+ b2 + 4 if b  a < 1 + b
1+a
2 if 1 + b  a
: (A3)
The correlation coe¢ cient when a  b is also
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 =
(a  b) (a+ b)
a2 + b2
> 0;


























24ab  4b+ b2 + 4 = 0
when a = (3b 2)(7b 2)8b ; but
(3b 2)(7b 2)
8b > b only when b  0:236; we have
pm   pd =
8<: 2 4b3 + 16
p
24ab  4b+ b2 + 4 > 0 if b  a < 1 + b
1+a 2b
2 > 0 if 1 + b  a
; (A4)
or pm > pd if a  b:










24ab  4b+ b2 + 4 if maxfb  23 ; 0g  a < 1 + b
1+a
2 if 1 + b  a
;
establishing Lemma 1.
Combining (A2) and (A4), we have
pm   pd
8>>><>>>:
< 0 if 0 < a < (3b 2)(7b 2)8b and b >
2
3
= 0 if 0 < a = (3b 2)(7b 2)8b and b >
2
3
> 0 if otherwise
; (A5)
establishing Proposition 1.
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